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INTRODUCTION 
The average citizen’s point of contact with the judicial system as a litigant 
is, most likely, in the nation’s municipal, county, or local courts.1 Whether 
she is contesting a traffic infraction, being charged with a misdemeanor, 
being cited for a violation of a local ordinance, or in a dispute with a 
neighbor or landlord, the average citizen is probably more likely to find 
herself in what might be called a “local court” than in a federal or high-level 
state court. Setting aside the controversy surrounding staffing village and 
town courts (which too often have nonlawyers with almost no legal training 
or knowledge serving as adjudicators),2 legal scholars have almost universally 
 
1 See, e.g., ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING 
THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 1 (2012), 
available at http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20 
PDF/CSP_DEC.ashx (“Of the 103.5 million incoming cases in 2010, 68 million (66%) were 
processed in limited jurisdiction courts.”). In 2009, the CSP reported that about ninety-five 
percent of cases filed nationwide were initiated in state courts. See ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN ET 
AL., COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS 
OF 2009 STATE COURT CASELOADS, at ii (2011), available at http://www.courtstatistics.org/ 
FlashMicrosites/CSP/images/CSP2009.pdf. Here, I exclude consideration of citizens’ interaction 
with the judicial system as jurors, which I have taken up in a recently published book chapter. See 
Ethan J. Leib & David L. Ponet, Citizen Representation and the American Jury, in IMPERFECT 
DEMOCRACIES: THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 269 (Patti 
Lenard & Richard Simeon eds., 2012). 
2 Several years ago, the New York Times, reporting on town and village courts in New York 
State, discovered widespread abuse and ignorance of the law by town and village court adjudicators—
and virtually no supervision by the state legal system. See William Glaberson, Delivering Small-
Town Justice, with a Mix of Trial and Error, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006, at A1; see also William 
Glaberson, How a Reviled Court System Has Outlasted Many Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2006, at 
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ignored the law in local courts, favoring the study of federal courts and state 
appellate courts.3 Much like the drunk man who looks under the lamppost 
for his lost keys at night because it is the only place he has the light to see, 
so too the legal scholar often studies published cases because they are 
available from databases at her fingertips.4 It is also likely that the sheer 
 
A1 (discussing the “long trail of injustice and mangled rulings” associated with the village court 
system and describing the system as “an anachronism that desperately needs to be overhauled or 
abandoned”); William Glaberson, In Tiny Courts of N.Y., Abuses of Law and Power, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 25, 2006, at A1 (describing the lack of legal experience or formal training among village 
judges and noting that “[s]imple men, and their simple wisdom, are the whole idea behind the 
justice courts”);. For my purposes here, I am simply assuming it is necessary to staff lower courts 
in our legal system with those trained in the law. 
3 But see Martin A. Levin, Urban Politics and the Criminal Courts: How Judicial Selection Methods 
Affect Sentencing, JUDGES J., Winter 1977, 16, 18-21, 56 (comparing the judicial selection processes 
and the behavior of local judges in Minneapolis and Pittsburgh). Recently, scholars have paid 
careful attention to a class of courts that divert people from incarceration. See, e.g., Allegra M. 
McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 
1590-91 (2012) (documenting a decarceration approach taking place in roughly 3000 “specialized 
criminal courts,” which “empower judges to adopt neo-realist problem-oriented roles [and] embrace 
less adversarial criminal procedures”). McLeod attests—albeit unsystematically—to the localist 
roots of these new judicial institutions. Id. at 1625-44. Other lower-level courts are also occasionally 
the subject of short investigations and small-scale case studies. See, e.g., Victor E. Flango, DWI 
Courts: The Newest Problem-Solving Courts, CT. REV., Spring 2005, 22, 22 (discussing DUI courts 
developed in response to the success of drug courts in reducing recidivism). And a most interesting 
article revealed a now-defunct municipal court that served only “black defendants arrested by 
black patrolmen.” Ernesto Longa, Lawson Edward Thomas and Miami’s Negro Municipal Court, 18 
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 125, 125, 128-33 (2005). To the extent scholars treat the lower state courts 
systematically, it is largely to evaluate citizens’ perceptions of them, rather than how the law is 
practiced within them. See, e.g., George W. Dougherty et al., Evaluating Performance in State 
Judicial Institutions: Trust and Confidence in the Georgia Judiciary, 38 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 176, 
184 (2006). Even political scientists who study judicial elections empirically have concluded that 
“[a]t the trial court level, systematic research has yet to be conducted.” CHRIS W. BONNEAU, 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y, A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE CONCERNING JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
5 (2012), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20120719_Bonneau2012WP.pdf. But see Sanford C. 
Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Behavior, 2 Q.J. 
POL. SCI. 107, 133 (2007) (studying the behavior of trial court judges when faced with “the threat 
of a viable challenger in an election”); Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and 
Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 248 (2004) (analyzing the 
relationship between trial judges’ sentencing behavior and electability). Local courts are studied 
even less frequently than trial courts as they are generally a hierarchical step below trial courts. 
4 There have been several empirical studies of small claims courts, however. See, e.g., JOHN C. 
RUHNKA & STEVEN WELLER WITH JOHN A. MARTIN, SMALL CLAIMS COURTS: A NATIONAL 
EXAMINATION 189-98 (1978); Arthur Best et al., Peace, Wealth, Happiness, and Small Claim Courts: 
A Case Study, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343, 344 (1994); William G. Haemmel, The North Carolina 
Small Claims Court—An Empirical Study, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 503, 508 (1973); Michael H. 
Minton & Jon E. Steffenson, Small Claims Courts: A Survey and Analysis, 55 JUDICATURE 324, 324 
(1972); Austin Sarat, Alternatives in Dispute Processing: Litigation in Small Claims Court, 10 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 339, 369-73 (1976); John M. Steadman & Richard S. Rosenstein, “Small Claims” 
Consumer Plaintiffs in the Philadelphia Municipal Court: An Empirical Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 
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diversity of local courts, the limitations on their subject matter jurisdiction, 
and the complexity of their organization nationwide render it hard to study 
these courts as a unitary class.5 The diversity and the lack of easily accessible 
decisions, however, cannot justify the lack of attention to how local judges 
should behave when faced with statutory questions, a task that comprises the 
day-to-day work of our local courts. These public officials are the face of law 
and justice to citizens in our democracy. What they do in their courtrooms 
when applying statutes is probably more relevant to citizens’ sense of the 
legitimacy of our legal system and the rule of law than the vast majority of 
the Supreme Court’s business at One First Street.  
As an initial step in thinking about these courts’ role in the administration 
of our legal system, the inquiry here focuses on two problems of statutory 
interpretation in local state courts. First, how should local courts interpret 
local ordinances? Second, may local courts bring local agendas to bear on the 
state statutes they implement? Previous scholarship in local government law 
has mined questions surrounding localities’ rights and limitations in promot-
ing federal constitutional visions,6 and their relationships with and responsi-
bilities to their home states and regions.7 But virtually all of this work, which 
 
1340 (1973); Neil Vidmar, The Small Claims Court: A Reconceptualization of Disputes and an Empirical 
Investigation, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 515, 545-49 (1984). 
5 The American Judicature Society maintains a website that contains information about the 
patchwork that makes up states’ lowest level courts with a useful interactive map. AM. JUDICATURE 
SOC’Y, http://www.judicialselection.us/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). I have included representative 
states’ judicial organizational charts for reference in the Appendix. 
6 See, e.g., David Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. 
PA. L. REV. 487, 490 (1999) (recognizing local governments as “important political institutions” 
that shape the lives of their citizenry rather than simply “agents of the states that ‘create’ them”); 
Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 
93 VA. L. REV. 959, 1033 (2007) (“The federal government has chosen to pursue an array of poli-
cies through the intermediary of local government, raising challenging questions for any account of 
federalism that ignores intergovernmental cooperation and the vital local role in such regimes.”); 
Kathleen S. Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 
5-6 (2012) (arguing that “local constitutional enforcement . . . has the potential to promote local 
power” and that local government could be better utilized by abandoning the Hunter doctrine—
named for Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 174, 176-78 (1907)—which characterizes local 
governments mere instrumentalities of the states). 
7 See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE 
URBAN INNOVATION 206 (2008) (discussing the lack of incentives for localities to work collectively); 
Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 99 (1990) (“[T]he Court’s belief that locally accountable governmental units are significant 
in practice and desirable in theory has led it to affirm . . . the operational independence of local 
governments from their states, and the important role local governments play in making law and 
policy in critical areas.”); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 389 (1990) (describing local governments as “state-created and state-
empowered yet particularly responsive to local residents’ social concerns”); Gerald E. Frug, Beyond 
Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1794 (2002) (borrowing “institutional ideas” from 
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is engaged in foundational debates surrounding the role of local govern-
ments within our state and federal constitutional structures, focuses on local 
governments’ legislative and administrative powers, and the ability of state 
and federal judiciaries to constrain or foster these powers.8 What has not 
been widely noticed is that the judges that serve in local courts are routinely 
selected locally and apply both local and state law. As a result, they occupy a 
complex position within the mosaic of local government. Indeed, local 
courts are quite often credibly part of the local government even though 
some local judges receive their salaries directly from the state.9 
If many local courts are (at least in important ways) parts of local gov-
ernments, this is yet another map on which we could, in theory, explore the 
debates between those in the “pro-localism” camp—interested in more local 
autonomy and vital democratic participation at the local level10—and those 
who are more skeptical—concerned about the dangers of homogeneity and 
exclusion at the local level. These skeptical scholars focus on the ways 
localism can impair the resolution of interlocal problems, prevent more 
equitable and less captured policies from taking hold at the state level, and 
 
the European Union to help “reconceptualize the relationship between local separateness and 
regional togetherness in the United States”). Some new and exciting work explores administrative 
law through local government practice. See Nestor M. Davidson & David Franklin, Local 
Administrative Law (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
8 See, e.g., David Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2257, 2367-84 (2003) 
(arguing that local governments cannot engage in local legal autonomy and that local communities 
will always be confined to state law regulations); Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 
1113, 1168 (2007) (arguing that state courts should play an active role in resolving conflicts between 
state and local law); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1062-74 
(1980) (describing the restrictions placed on cities by state and federal government, with the result 
that current cities “do not have the power to solve their current problems or to control their future 
development”); Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory 
Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959, 964 (1991) (arguing that the doctrine 
of limited municipal powers has been invoked in a wide array of contexts to limit local power); 
Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The Politics of City 
Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 83, 101-20 (analyzing historical conceptions of 
municipal government). 
9 For a book focusing on judges and cities that treats judges as outside the city looking in 
rather than as a part of the city itself, see GORDON L. CLARK, JUDGES AND THE CITIES: 
INTERPRETING LOCAL AUTONOMY (1985). The organizational charts in the Appendix, infra, 
reveal the funding sources of some local courts. 
10 Generally, Frug and Barron are the central “pro-localism” campers. See Barron, supra note 
8, at 2384-86 (arguing for an active role for local government in battling sprawl); Barron, supra 
note 6, at 561-63 (arguing that localism expands the power of towns and cities to correct inequities 
and impart constitutional values); Frug, supra note 7, at 1788 (“The legal system needs to give 
metropolitan residents more choices.”); Frug, supra note 8, at 1060 (calling for a “restructuring [of] 
American society itself” to restore power to cities). 
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fail to be sufficiently sensitive to citizens’ multijurisdictional commitments.11 
That debate, regarding how much power and authority local governments 
should have, is unavoidable, but it is not one I will be able to resolve 
completely here.  
Instead, I want to use the discovery of local courts as instrumentalities 
of local governments to analyze some practical problems of statutory 
interpretation in these institutions. Although the fount of so much local 
government law is actually a canon of statutory construction (known as 
“Dillon’s Rule”),12 almost no attention has been paid to statutory interpreta-
tion at the lowest levels of the judicial hierarchy.13 Notwithstanding recent 
calls for “federalism all the way down,”14 “intersystemic statutory interpreta-
tion,”15 and more attention to “hierarchy and heterogeneity” in our nation’s 
judiciaries,16 no one is considering how local courts are interpreting stat-
utes—whether the statutes are passed in state or local legislatures—or how 
they ought to do so. And these local courts perform the bulk of statutory 
implementation. I focus here on what approach local courts should take 
when interpreting local statutory law and state statutory law. The latter 
inquiry might be called an “intrastate reverse-Erie” problem.17 Specifically, 
 
11 Briffault and Gillette are the likely skeptics. See supra notes 7-8; see also Richard Thompson 
Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1908-09 
(1994) (“A centralized regional authority . . . leaves little opportunity for politically empowered 
cultural communities to form and thrive.”).  
12 For a discussion of Dillon’s Rule and its parameters, see 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 237–239, at 448-55 (5th ed. 1911). The rule 
stands for the principle that local governments “possess and can exercise only (1) powers granted in 
express words; (2) powers necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly 
granted, and (3) powers essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of 
the entity—not simply convenient, but indispensable.” Shorts v. Bartholomew, 278 S.W.3d 268, 
276 (Tenn. 2009). Many recent cases implement the rule. E.g., id. at 276-77. 
13  See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological 
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1760-71 (2010) (bringing new 
attention to statutory interpretation at the state level but not investigating lower-level state 
courts).  
14 Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way 
Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8-9 (2010).  
15 Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 
120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1990-97 (2011). 
16 Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 
97 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 442 (2012). Lower federal courts have been the subject of study within 
constitutional law. See Ori Aronson, Inferiorizing Judicial Review: Popular Constitutionalism in Trial 
Courts, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 971, 987 (2010). 
17 For introductions to “reverse-Erie” issues, see Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the 
Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1501, 1554 (2006); Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-
Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 20 (2006); and Joseph R. Oliveri, Converse-Erie: The Key to 
Federalism in an Increasingly Administrative State, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1372, 1377-79 (2008). 
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just as state courts need guidelines in order to apply substantive federal law 
in the typical reverse-Erie scenario,18 local courts need similar guidelines in 
order to apply state law. 
Part I of this Article defines the category of local courts for analysis, as 
well as the types of cases those courts typically hear. Part II then explores 
what it could mean for such local courts to pursue a “localist” agenda and 
analyzes its desirability under certain conditions. This analysis considers the 
kinds of elections that routinely place local judges into their offices and the 
manner in which local courts are embedded within state and local institu-
tional structures. I conclude by asserting that the (concededly modest) 
accountability available for local judicial performance, combined with the 
possibility for careful state supervision of “localist” judicial action, supports 
giving local courts more discretion in interpreting both local ordinances and 
state statutes. On the whole, the argument aims to reveal the benefits of a 
type of “intrastate judicial federalism” that promotes dialogue and experi-
mentation in the development of statewide policy. My conclusion draws 
from the perspectives of both “pro-localism” views as well as those more 
enamored of state power, highlighting some ways to settle that debate in at 
least this one understudied context. 
 I. WHAT IS A LOCAL COURT AND WHAT CASES DOES IT HEAR? 
Given the great variety in state court systems, demarcating a category of 
“local courts” requires some specificity. The heterogeneity of these courts 
has likely been partially responsible for the academic community’s unwill-
ingness to study or theorize about them as a class in the past, so it is worth 
getting a more refined definition clear to begin that process. Here are a few 
common characteristics of the kinds of courts I focus upon: local courts, as 
discussed here, (1) are at nearly the lowest rung within state judicial hierar-
chies, but render decisions appealable to higher-level state courts; (2) have 
limited subject matter jurisdiction; (3) have decisionmakers who are formally 
trained, licensed attorneys;19 (4) have judges who are seated through election 
 
18 State courts are essentially required to hear federal claims. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 
394 (1947). For the debate on why, whether, or to what extent this is so, see Michael G. Collins, 
Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 78; Vicki 
C. Jackson, Printz and Testa: The Infrastructure of Federal Supremacy, 32 IND. L. REV. 111, 118-20 
(1998); Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer State Courts: 
Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REV. 71, 75 (1998); and Louise Weinberg, 
The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: “Actual” Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1743, 1750 (1992). 
19 Here, I am avoiding the debate about whether it is sound (or constitutional) to have lay 
people adjudicating cases in the legal system. See Gordon v. Justice Court, 525 P.2d 72, 73 (Cal. 
1974) (holding that it is a violation of the Federal Constitution to allow nonattorney judges to sit 
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by the population of a local government or a set of local government units; 
and (5) apply and enforce local and state law within their territorial jurisdic-
tion. Who funds local courts—state or locality—is not decisive in this 
typology, since it is possible for a state to pay judicial salaries but still 
expect the judge to be serving primarily a local community and applying 
local law. In some local courts, the local government itself provides funding 
to pay the judges.  
Admittedly, this classification leaves out some judicial institutions that 
might colloquially be viewed as local courts. Some justice courts, for 
example, are staffed by nonlawyers—and many magistrate, mayor’s, and 
municipal courts are appointive institutions.20 Some classes of lower trial 
courts of general jurisdiction might also “feel” local to residents within their 
reach who have elected their judges; but these courts are, for my typological 
purposes, considered part of the state, rather than the local, political 
system.21 All of these institutions fall outside the ambit of my analysis here 
by definition; since “local courts” are not a natural category, I start with an 
 
in judgment over criminal defendants for offenses punishable by incarceration); see also North v. 
Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 339 (1976) (suggesting that it is not unconstitutional to subject an offender 
to possible imprisonment before a nonattorney judge, so long as de novo review is available in a 
court with a legally trained judge); City of White House v. Whitley, 979 S.W.2d 262, 267-68 
(Tenn. 1998) (rejecting the logic of North and finding nonlawyer adjudications imposing jail time to 
violate Tennessee’s Constitution). New York has many village and town courts without lawyer 
adjudicators, and given the New York Times’s reporting several years ago, see supra note 2, it is hard 
to think it is anything but a scandal. Still, once I perform an analysis of the kinds of courts at the 
center of my consideration here, it will be possible for others to use that analysis to explore those 
courts without lawyers at the helm. 
20
 See, e.g., The Qualifications to Become a Municipal Court Judge, N.J. JUDICIARY, http:// 
www.judiciary.state.nj.us/mcs/qualifications.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2013) (noting that New Jersey 
lower courts are largely appointive); About the Courts, UNIFIED JUDICIARY SYS. PA., 
http://www.pacourts.us/Links/Public/AboutTheCourts.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2013) (describing 
how Pennsylvania lower courts allow nonlawyer adjudicators); Court Structure of Texas, TEX. 
COURTS ONLINE (Sept. 1, 1997), http://www.courts.state.tx.us/pubs/ar97/crtstr97.htm (noting that 
some Texas lower court judges are elected and staffed by lawyers, while others are not). 
21
 Some county courts that hear cases under local law—as in Nebraska—see themselves, first 
and foremost, as instrumentalities of the state judiciary. Even though Nebraska county judges are 
subject to local retention elections (after gubernatorial appointment), they seem to adopt the 
culture of the state. See E-mail from Alan Brodbeck, Judge, Cnty. Court, Eighth Judicial Circuit, 
to author ( July 9, 2012, 12:31 PM) (on file with author); E-mail from Philip Martin, Jr., Judge, Hall 
Cnty. Court, to author ( July 5, 2012, 6:00 PM) (on file with author); E-mail from Beth Pullen, 
Clerk Magistrate, Merrick Cnty. Court, to author ( July 5, 2012, 3:01 PM) (on file with author); E-
mail from Frank J. Skorupa, Judge, Platte Cnty. Court, to author ( July 6, 2012, 10:47 AM) (on file 
with author); E-mail from Darrie Streeter, Clerk Magistrate, Phelps Cnty. Court, to author ( July 
5, 2012, 3:30 AM) (on file with author). But see E-mail from Sandy Medinger, Clerk Magistrate, 
Harlan Cnty. Court, to author ( July 11, 2012) (on file with author) (confirming that the judges in 
county court are a part of the state judiciary but that they maintain relationships with local 
constituents because of retention elections). 
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archetype. Still, a large range of municipal, county, and district courts possess 
the listed criteria identified here—and millions of civil and criminal matters 
are adjudicated in these kinds of courts each year.22 
The transsubstantive scope of cases local courts hear also makes it diffi-
cult to theorize about them as a singular category. For example, local courts 
can handle probate matters, family law matters (such as custody, divorce, 
and adoption), traffic infractions, small civil claims, juvenile matters, mis-
demeanor criminal offenses, landlord-tenant disputes, and violations of local 
ordinances. Yet, the diversity of subject matter notwithstanding, these local 
courts act within a circumscribed sphere, often being the first line of 
enforcement in a local legal culture. Let me describe two examples of local 
courts to provide a taste of the local flavor. 
Charleston is West Virginia’s capital and largest city. It has a population 
of about 51,000, which is 78% white and 16% black.23 The municipal court 
judgeship in Charleston is an elective office with a four-year term.24 Although 
West Virginia allows nonlawyers to be municipal judges, the charter in 
Charleston requires that the judge be a lawyer.25 The current judge, Anne 
Charnock, ran for her office in Spring 2011. Judge Charnock serves part-
time and also maintains a solo practice, specializing in wills and trusts.26 
Her father was also a municipal judge decades earlier.27  
The jurisdiction of the court includes misdemeanors under state law 
(such as shoplifting, assault, battery, and prostitution), traffic violations, and 
local ordinance violations—but the court cannot, by state statute, punish a 
defendant with more than thirty days in jail or a $500 fine.28 Defendants are 
entitled to a de novo appeal in the circuit courts of the state, which sit just 
below the state’s high court, the Supreme Court of Appeals. Judge Charnock 
does not see the municipal court as part of the state judicial hierarchy; she 
sees herself as principally interested in local concerns.29  
 
22 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
23 This information is from the 2010 census. See State and County Quickfacts: Charleston (City), 
West Virginia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/54/5414600.html (last 
revised Sept. 18, 2012). 
24 CHARLESTON, W. VA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 35 (2003), available at http://library. 
municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=13013. 
25 Id. § 45. 
26 E-mail from Judge Anne Charnock, Charleston Mun. Court, to author ( July 16, 2012, 18:59 
EDT) (on file with author). 
27 Id. 
28 E-mail from Judge Anne Charnock, Charleston Mun. Court, to author ( July 3, 2012, 14:46 
EDT) (on file with author). 
29 Id. 
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Chillicothe, Ohio’s first capital, is located in Ross County in the south-
ern part of the state. It has a population of about 22,000, which is 88% white 
and 7% black.30 Judge John Street was originally elected to the Chillicothe 
Municipal Court for a six-year term; he is currently serving his third such 
term.31 The court has jurisdiction over local traffic violations, state criminal 
misdemeanors, civil cases with plaintiffs seeking less than $15,000, collection 
actions, and replevin cases.32 The judge hears both local law and state law 
cases, both of which may be appealed to higher courts within Ohio’s state 
appellate system.33 Judge Street sees himself as part of the state judiciary 
but acknowledges that he was elected by the jurisdiction where he serves 
and thinks, therefore, it is “probably necessary” to maintain relationships 
with constituents to be reelected.34 
*      *      * 
This is obviously a selective tour, meant only to illustrate the class of 
courts discussed in this Article. I have limited the category here not because 
there is a clear border around these local courts, but because the courts in 
this class routinely share the features I adumbrated earlier—features which 
form excellent starting points for the following analysis. Once I am able to 
 
30 See State and County Quickfacts: Chillicothe (City), Ohio, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http:// 
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/39/3914184.html (last revised Sept. 12, 2012). 
31 E-mail from John B. Street, Judge, Chillicothe Mun. Court, to author ( July 5, 2012, 10:55 
EDT) (on file with author). 
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
34 Id.; accord E-mail from Mark Mihok, Judge, City of Lorain Mun. Court, to author ( July 9, 
2012, 10:13 AM) (on file with author) (claiming that the court’s docket is comprised of equal 
numbers of state and local cases, that the court is principally part of the local government, and that 
it is important “to be visible in the community” because of the judge’s elective status); E-mail 
from Julie L. Monnin, Judge, Darke Cnty. Mun. Court, to author (July 6, 2012, 11:08 AM) (on file with 
author) (confirming that judges in municipal court in Ohio are elected and maintain relationships 
with constituents, that the court applies “state law locally,” that it is part of local government, and 
that its decisions are appealable to higher level courts in the state). But see E-mail from William G. 
Lauber, Judge, Lima Mun. Court, to author ( July 9, 2012, 5:02 PM) (on file with author) (stating 
that he “feel[s he is] a member of the state judiciary” and that “maintaining a relationship to [his] 
constituents must be done carefully”); E-mails from Sharon Thomasson, Clerk, Maumee Mun. 
Court, to author ( July 10, 2012, 11:58 AM & 2:31 PM) (on file with author) (noting that Judge 
Gary Byers thinks of himself as “fall[ing] under state government” and that “it is part of the 
Judge’s job to maintain relationships with his constituents”); see also E-mail from Gary Dumm, 
Judge, Circleville Mun. Court, to author ( July 5, 2012, 10:20 AM) (on file with author) (stating 
that he sees himself as “part of the state court system,” while acknowledging that decisions must 
“have some regard for local concerns, but with equal consideration for uniformity around the 
state”). Notably, Judge Dumm claims that “handling cases with a major concern for public opinion 
would not be in keeping with the oath of office [he] took where [he] agreed to support the 
Constitutions of Ohio and the United States.” E-mail from Judge Gary Dumm, supra.  
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identify some relevant normative benchmarks for how to think about this 
category of courts, it will be possible to ask about another court with 
somewhat different features whether it is susceptible to the same treatment. 
Whether it is a village court, town court, police court, or lower court of 
general jurisdiction, the analytics presented in what follows will be helpful 
when considering how that court should do its work in interpreting statutes.  
II. ARE LOCAL COURTS “LOCALIST” IN THEIR STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION? SHOULD THEY BE? 
A. “Localist” Judging: What Is It? Does It Occur? 
There are several different types of what might be termed “localist” 
judging—some more controversial than others.35 From one perspective, 
“localist” judging might mean infusing local court decisions with local 
preferences. Specifically, a localist judge might engage in self-conscious or 
un–self-conscious majoritarian estimation by trying to apply a state statute 
or local ordinance in a manner she expects her constituents to prefer. Alterna-
tively, a judge could be “localist” in reading a statute in a way that takes 
especial concern for the welfare of local citizens or local government, focusing 
not on public opinion but on the judge’s sense of the locality’s best overall 
interest. This localism could be set against statewide or interlocal interests 
(the traditional way people characterize “localism”); but even where those 
sets of interests do not conflict, the judge could still be focusing principally 
on the interests of the locality. Finally, a judge can be “localist” by applying 
local mores and norms to legal texts before him or by paying more attention 
to local morality and ethics than to the enactor’s legislative intent, whether 
of the state or the local government. Note that all these strains of “localist” 
judging can occur more easily when the underlying language (or legislative 
intent) being interpreted is ambiguous or open to multiple interpretations. 
And I limit my analysis of “localist” judging here to contexts where text and 
legislative will produces some ambiguity in statutory interpretation. Ulti-
mately, some limited evidence shows that “localist” statutory interpretation 
is occurring, and there are good arguments for why it should be welcomed 
as a practice within certain parameters.  
Admittedly, it is not easy to ascertain what is occurring in these local 
courtrooms with a high level of confidence. Because local courts are much 
less likely to publish their decisions than state courts higher in the judicial 
hierarchy, a scholar would need to sit in local courtrooms for long periods of 
 
35 Thanks to Nestor Davidson and Annie Decker for encouraging me to be clearer here. 
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time and read reams of motion papers to discover with any degree of reliability 
what goes on in these halls of justice. There are, however, a few indirect 
methods of gathering information about the form statutory interpretation 
takes within local courts: one can ask relevant judges about their practices 
and one can read appeals taken from local courts in the state court reporters. 
To be sure, much interpretation goes on with little self-consciousness, so 
direct questioning has its limitations. And there is a built-in bias in looking 
at decisions of higher courts reviewing local courts: precisely because deci-
sions from these local courts are appealable to higher state courts, these courts 
might anticipatorily take statewide interests into account, knowing they might 
be reversed otherwise. The places where one would likely see the most 
aggressive use of the law to address local needs and priorities, perhaps, are in 
the most invisible courts, where decisions are barely supervised by the rest 
of the state judiciary. Still, these imperfect sources of evidence suggest that 
local courts are, in fact, engaging in some brands of “localist” judging. 
One local judge in the Lima Municipal Court in Ohio, for example, said 
the following: 
Local concerns are considered when sentencing with regard to how our 
county and city (as embodied in my judgment) feel about how certain crimes 
should be punished, and whether or not the goals of punishment can be met 
with a fine only; probation or community control; a jail sentence; or, any 
combination of all of the aforementioned. I, also, consider the local capacity 
of our jail and the most judicious use of our resources.36 
Although this judge considers himself “a member of the state judiciary,”37 he 
is clearly in the business of using statutory law to address and accommodate 
local needs and priorities. These sentencing decisions, made under state law, 
color the application of state statutes with local considerations. It is reason-
able to assume that in a close question of statutory interpretation, this judge 
would allow local interests to infuse state law.  
Another judge in a municipal court in Lorain, Ohio—a manufacturing 
district between Cleveland and Toledo—said that that he is sensitive to local 
“employability” issues and tries hard to find “appropriate sentence[s]” with 
prosecutors to deal with state-mandated sentencing, convictions that lead to 
required driver’s license suspension, and convictions that would harm a 
 
36 E-mail from William G. Lauber, Judge, Lima Mun. Court, to author ( July 9, 2012, 17:02 
EDT) (on file with author). 
37 Id. 
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person’s ability to get or maintain a job.38 In the municipality of Cambridge, 
Ohio, Judge John Nicholson (who thinks of himself as a member of the state 
judiciary but acknowledges that he is perceived by the public as part of the 
local government) said that “in those areas where aspects of judicial discre-
tion are proper, it is good to know what the local public standards are, and 
what the electorate expects would be ‘just.’”39 This local judge referenced 
former Ohio Supreme Court Chief Justice Thomas Moyer, who “used to tell 
the municipal judges that since, for most people, their only contact with the 
legal system would be in the municipal court, that [local judges] were 
responsible for the . . . people’s perspective on the law.”40 
The appellate state court reporters also reveal some local courts promoting 
local policies through their decisions. Consider one example, in which an 
Indiana state appellate court found itself reviewing the statutory interpreta-
tion of a county juvenile court. The juvenile court judge, an elected local 
judge,41 had read a state adoption statute to preclude same sex–couple joint 
adoptions, and the state appellate court disagreed with its reading in the 
following words:  
We observe that one of the bases for the Juvenile Court’s . . . order was [the 
local court’s] understanding of the policies of Morgan County. . . . But 
county courts must be guided by state law rather than local practice in car-
rying out their duties: “[a] general statute, enacted by the people of the 
entire state through their representatives, speaks for and to the whole popu-
lation, and therefore cannot be given or be supposed to have a merely local 
meaning, or a meaning varying to suit the special usage prevailing in the 
several localities.” In fact, “[u]niformity in the interpretation and applica-
tion of the law is the keystone in our system of jurisprudence.” Accordingly, 
the Juvenile Court—and, indeed, all local courts—must base its decisions on 
state law, and must also ensure that local practice complies with state law.42 
It is, perhaps, not altogether surprising to see a state court in this  
context seeking to achieve, and expecting, state uniformity. Even if a state’s 
 
38 E-mail from Mark Mihok, Judge, City of Lorain Mun. Court, to author ( July 10, 2012, 
10:27 EDT) (on file with author). 
39 E-mail from Katherine Archibald on behalf of John M. Nicholson, Judge, Cambridge 
Mun. Court, to author ( July 17, 2012, 14:29 EDT) (on file with author). 
40 Id. 
41 I confirmed with the County Commissioner that the Juvenile Court Judge (now a higher 
level judge in the county) was elected. See E-mail from Don Adams, Comm’r, Morgan Cnty., to 
author ( July 9, 2012, 09:12 EDT) (on file with author). 
42 In re Infant Girl W., 845 N.E.2d 229, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Cook v. State, 59 
N.E. 489, 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 1901); Warren v. Ind. Tel. Co., 26 N.E.2d 399, 405 (Ind. 1940)). 
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constitution and statutes are generous in their home-rule provisions—giving 
localities broad spheres of dominion within their jurisdictions—it might be 
assumed that state legislatures, executives, and courts expect statewide 
statutes to have uniform application within the state. But that is not neces-
sarily true. Instead, states might have good reason to tolerate disuniformity, 
and it may be desirable to allow local courts some room to infuse statutes 
with local preferences, interests, and mores. In the Sections below, I consid-
er the best arguments that can be marshaled to defend localist judging in 
statutory interpretation cases.  
B. The Case for Localist Readings of Local Law 
Before considering the dynamics associated with what one might call 
“intrastate judicial federalism,” it is worth considering a more purely local 
context: where a local judge applies only local law, an ordinance passed 
within the legislative competence of the local legislature.43 Imagine certain 
features of a local traffic code or fishing rules, adopted by a city council, that 
apply only within the boundaries of a locality. Litigants in a local court 
under these ordinances may make statutory arguments, asking the court to 
interpret the relevant ordinance in a manner favorable to their preferred 
disposition. Prosecutors may ask judges to consider local norms in deter-
mining how a vague or complex ordinance should be applied. Defendants or 
plantiffs may ask local judges to consider local culture in evaluating a legal 
standard. How ought the local judge think of her role in adjudicating these 
statutory cases? 
Admittedly, few of these local court cases are likely to present particularly 
difficult questions of statutory interpretation.44 And it is only in the band of 
difficult cases where statutory interpretation approaches diverge anyway, 
and where the interpretation wars between strict textualists and purposivists 
 
43 I am removing from consideration here challenges to ultra vires local ordinances, which are 
preempted by state law or are otherwise outside the home-rule authorization granted by the state. 
See generally Diller, supra note 8, at 1126 (“[A]n ordinance conflicting with state law is necessarily 
ultra vires in a legislative home rule system because it lies outside the grant of authority to the 
city.”). Obviously, when challenges to local ordinances are rooted in conflict with state statutory 
law, the question of whether the ordinance is ultra vires will be a question of statutory interpreta-
tion (of potentially both the ordinance and a statewide law). See, e.g., City of Portland v. Jackson, 
850 P.2d 1093, 1098 (Or. 1993) (relying on legislative commentary to determine that the Oregon 
Criminal Code does not conflict with a local ordinance). 
44 See E-mail from Anne Charnock, Judge, Charleston Mun. Court, to author ( July 15, 2012, 
20:14 EDT) (on file with author) (“In the big scheme of things much of what comes to [Municipal 
Court] is not subject to many interpretations.”). 
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produce real differences in decisionmaking.45 When text is clear, or prece-
dent is directly on point,46 almost all agree that lower courts should follow 
clear law. This is, after all, the minimum of what the rule of law likely 
requires. But every difficult case starts in a lower court. Theorists of statutory 
interpretation argue about what the highest courts in the land ought to do 
about these difficult cases, but we similarly need to account for what local 
courts should do when faced with a difficult question of local law. 
In previous work (with Professor Aaron-Andrew Bruhl), I have considered 
whether the electoral status of certain state judges should affect how those 
judges read statutes.47 As a general matter, the paper drew the following 
conclusions, which serve as a point of departure for my inquiry here: 
First, there is a strong assumption among scholars that “a judge is a 
judge” and that the office of judge carries with it interpretive duties that 
supervene over selection methods.48 
Second, the conventional idea in statutory interpretation cases that 
judges are supposed to be “faithful agents” of the legislature does not make 
as much sense in the context of elective judiciaries as it does in environ-
ments of appointive judiciaries. Legislatures do not obviously and always 
 
45 See, e.g., John M. Walker, Jr., Judicial Tendencies in Statutory Construction: Differing Views on 
the Role of the Judge, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 203, 203 (2001) (“Easy cases are resolved short 
of litigation or settled early; the costs of litigation normally filter them out, leaving appellate 
judges with the hard [statutory interpretation] cases.”); see also Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, 
The Costs of Consensus in Statutory Construction, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 47, 60-61 (2010), http:// 
yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/900.pdf (“Ultimately, the easy cases hardly require elaborate 
theorizing . . . .”). 
46 There is a plausible argument, however, that elective judiciaries might have a looser rela-
tionship to stare decisis. See Stefanie A. Lindquist, Stare Decisis as Reciprocity Norm (noting that 
“partisan elected courts are far more likely to overturn existing precedent than courts selected by 
other methods”), in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES DO AND WHY IT 
MATTERS 173, 184-85 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011). Arguably, when an electorate strongly 
reacts to a decision it thinks is bad, it is no great surprise and no great betrayal to the rule of law 
for newly elected judges to set the law back on the course constituents prefer. 
47 See Bruhl & Leib, supra note †, at Part III.  
48 See id. at 1227 (citing, for example, James L. Gibson, Judging the Politics of Judging: Are Poli-
ticians in Robes Inevitably Illegitimate? (explaining that a majority of respondents want judges to 
follow the law, though many also report that they want judges to reflect voters’ views), in WHAT’S 
LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?, supra note 46, at 281, 289); see also ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 3-4 
(1997) (“[A]pproaches to statutory interpretation are not divisible into ‘state’ and ‘federal.’ 
Differences in interpretive approaches are the product of individual judicial sensibilities and not, 
for the most part, particular jurisdictions.”); Todd D. Rakoff, Statutory Interpretation as a Multifarious 
Enterprise, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1559, 1572 (2010) (“[J]udges are selected, one way or another, to act 
like judges, a role whose specifications does not depend on the presence or absence of popular 
election.”); Jordan M. Singer, The Mind of the Judicial Voter, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1443, 1447 
(asserting that “voter decisionmaking in judicial elections” is based more on conceptions of 
“procedural justice” than voters’ “own policy preferences”)).  
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have better democratic credibility than legislatures when judges are elected. 
If state constitutions (or local charters) determine that judges should be 
elected, the internal logic of that design choice probably should have some 
effect on how those judges decide hard cases.49  
Third, if elected judges have democratic credibility, they may have  
interpretive freedom to pursue the interests of their constituents, rather 
than the revealed preferences of voters or legislators who passed the law in 
the first instance.50 Although these kinds of exercises of statutory interpre-
tation may be troublesome for appointed judges with no real knowledge of 
their constituents and with no democratic credibility to go beyond the 
legislature, elected judges are often in a position to exercise interpretive 
freedom competently because they have real information about their 
constituents and are subject to accountability. 
Finally, the type of election to which the relevant judge is subject—
competitive, retention, nonpartisan—might tell us something important 
about the range of interpretive freedom that is normatively defensible. The 
more democratically credible the election or future mode of accountability, 
the greater the berth of discretion to pursue an approximation of the 
constituents’ common good in hard cases.51 The common good may be 
minoritarian rather than majoritarian, too. 
 
49 See Bruhl & Leib, supra note †, at 1229 (citing, for example, Daniel A. Farber, Statutory 
Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 318 (1989) (discussing how the metaphor 
“of the court as the legislature’s agent . . . is useful to illuminate the ways statutes constrain courts” 
but that it does not address the extent to which courts should shape policy); Thomas W. Merrill, 
Faithful Agent, Integrative, and Welfarist Interpretation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1565, 1575 (2010) 
(“[F]aithful agent interpretation is necessary in order to preserve the bedrock principle of our 
constitutional government—popular sovereignty.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the 
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 437 (1989) (“The agency view starts from the important 
truth that it would be improper for judges to construe statutes to mean whatever the judges think 
best; the lawmaking primacy of the legislature, with its superior democratic pedigree, prohibits 
such a conception of statutory ‘interpretation.’”)).  
50 See Bruhl & Leib, supra note †, at Parts II & III (discussing scenarios in which judges are 
more democratically accountable and less subject to interest-group capture than legislators). Bruhl 
and I also considered other forms of interpretive freedom—like the freedom to pursue a judge’s 
own policy preferences or the freedom to depart from constituent preferences. 
51 Id. at Part III. The raging empirical debate about which type of judicial election maximizes 
independence and which optimizes accountability is obviously relevant to those hydraulics, but 
these subtleties must be ignored here. See Brandice Canes-Wrone & Tom S. Clark, Judicial 
Independence and Nonpartisan Elections, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 21, 52 (finding that “judges’ votes in 
nonpartisan states are significantly more likely to be aligned with public opinion than judges’ votes 
in partisan states”); Brandice Canes-Wrone et al., Judicial Independence and Retention Elections, 28 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 211, 229 (2012) (finding that judges in states with retention elections are not 
more independent than judges in states with nonpartisan elections); Michael S. Kang & Joanna 
M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and 
Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 73 (2011) (finding that partisan judges are more likely to 
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I do not revisit these theses or offer proof for them in this context, but, 
assuming they are plausible conclusions, they can be applied to local judges 
here, as well. To wit, because local judges are elected by local constituents 
(by definitional design), they likely have some democratic credibility to 
interpret local laws with some attention to the good of their constituents. 
And because they can always be unseated during the next election cycle, 
judges can be held accountable for interpretive decisions that overreach. 
Even those who are skeptical about judicial elections as a selection mecha-
nism for seating or retaining judges should appreciate that those design 
choices were made deliberately—more specifically, made for some reason 
relating to how institutional designers wanted judging to proceed.52 For 
example, even those who oppose the Seventeenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution and wish our U.S. Senators were still chosen by state legisla-
tures rather than direct election probably do not think the office and role of 
the Senator perfectly supervenes over selection methods for picking Senators. 
As such, how we select those who serve in governmental offices reveals 
some of the normative structure of how they are supposed to perform their 
jobs. With respect to elective judiciaries, direct election structurally and 
normatively supports the case for judges pursuing the common good of 
constituents in close cases, when other clearly authoritative sources for 
interpretation run out. 
Still, there is reason to doubt the meaningfulness of judicial elections at 
the local level. It is conventionally believed that the elections that seat, 
retain, or unseat local judges are not particularly salient with the electorate 
and do not inspire a great deal of deliberation.53 Moreover, many of these 
elections are controlled by political party machines and are not contested.54 
 
vote for business interests when campaign contributions increase but that this relationship does 
not hold for nonpartisan elections). 
52 See generally JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA 1-13 (2012) (discussing the evolution of judicial selec-
tion); Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in 
Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190, 190-93 (1993). 
53 See Charles A. Johnson et al., The Salience of Judicial Candidates and Elections, 59 SOC. SCI. 
Q. 371, 374 (1978) (finding that only 2.5% of voters surveyed could name a single candidate in an 
uncontested county court election, while 14.5% of voters “could recall the name of one candidate 
for the state supreme court or court of criminal appeals”). We actually know very little about 
elections for local judges, however. Almost all of the empirical literature on judicial elections is 
about state supreme courts, and a very small subset of the literature is about appellate-level 
elections. See BONNEAU, supra note 3, at 10 (suggesting that voters “may not have enough 
information in intermediate appellate or trial court elections” but acknowledging that “[t]his is 
certainly an area in need of further research”).  
54 See, e.g., Lopez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 462 F.3d 161, 171-81 (2d Cir. 2006)  
(describing the vetting for New York trial court judges as dominated by local party bosses), rev’d, 
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And some of these elections may be financed by out-of-state groups and 
citizens, undermining the idea that the election reflects local opinion or that 
judges are accountable to local citizens.55 Accordingly, it might seem that 
local judicial elections provide only the thinnest of invitations for localist 
interpretive freedom within local courts.  
Nevertheless, the invitation does exist. There is some evidence that  
although local judicial elections are not especially salient with the general 
public, informed and attentive voters follow judicial elections and make 
meaningful decisions that hold judges accountable.56 Other evidence indicates 
that lower-level elective courts are especially responsive to constituents.57 
Therefore, even if competition rates are low and voter indifference is high,58 
it is still possible to consider local judicial elections a mechanism for 
 
552 U.S. 196 (2008). For evidence that trial court elections are not highly contested as a general 
matter (though there is much variation among states), see Michael J. Nelson, Uncontested and 
Unaccountable? Rates of Contestation in Trial Court Elections, 94 JUDICATURE 208, 209 (2011), which 
found that “over 75 percent of contestable judicial elections used to fill seats on general jurisdiction 
trial courts are uncontested.” Again, very little information is available about courts that are not 
general jurisdiction trial courts, but one might draw inferences from the data nevertheless. 
55 See, e.g., Canes-Wrone et al., supra note 51, at 214 (describing how out-of-state groups con-
tribute “enormous sums of money” to state judicial elections); David E. Pozen, What Happened in 
Iowa?, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 90, 93-94 (2011), http://www.columbialawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/90_Pozen.pdf (discussing the 2010 Iowa judicial election in which out-of-
state groups spent more money on the elections than in-state groups); Roy A. Schotland, Iowa’s 
2010 Judicial Election: Appropriate Accountability or Rampant Passion?, CT. REV., nos. 1 & 2, 2011, 118, 
120-21 (showing the importance of out-of-state funds to defeat judges in Iowa and Nebraska); 
Linda Casey, Independent Expenditure Campaigns in Iowa Topple Three High Court Justices, NAT’L INST. 
ON MONEY IN STATE POL. ( Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.followthemoney.org/press/PrintReport 
View.phtml?r=440 (noting that out-of-state groups spent over $900,000 on the 2010 election for Iowa 
Supreme Court justices). 
56 See Nicholas P. Lovrich et al., Citizen Knowledge and Voting in Judicial Elections, 73 JUDICATURE 
28, 30 (1989) (arguing that the people most likely to vote in judicial elections are “well-informed 
and active citizens [that] keep the politicians accountable to the public at large”); Nicholas P. 
Lovrich, Jr. & Charles H. Sheldon, Voters in Judicial Elections: An Attentive Public or an Uninformed 
Electorate?, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 23, 30, 31 tbl.1 (1984) (describing how participating voters in a 1982 
Oregon election “possessed a relatively high level of knowledge about courts”).  
57 See Huber & Gordon, supra note 3, at 249 (stating that judges alter their behavior when 
elections approach even though the probability of losing is low). 
58 Given how little we know, it is always possible that there might be higher voting rates (and 
less rolloff) in local judicial elections than in statewide judicial elections, even without large 
infusions of capital for campaign spending, because local judges often come from small, tight-knit 
communities and actually know their constituents. While one study suggests otherwise, see 
Johnson et al., supra note 53, at 374, it is outdated and has not been replicated. Nevertheless, some 
studies of appellate courts show evidence of increasing indifference down the hierarchical chain. 
See Matthew J. Streb et al., Voter Rolloff in a Low-Information Context: Evidence from Intermediate 
Appellate Court Elections, 37 AM. POL. RES. 644, 647, 648 (2009) (“The average rolloff in [appellate 
court] elections is sizeable and greater than the average rolloff in supreme court elections but the 
difference is not as large as one might expect.”).  
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meaningful accountability because voters are satisfied and judges are 
responsive.59 Moreover, there is evidence—at least from the lower-level 
appellate courts—that incumbents face a real risk of losing.60 Finally, while 
out-of-state interest groups have provided funding for campaigns in 
statewide judicial elections, there is little evidence that they similarly 
finance local court elections; the money is largely reserved for the highest 
level courts.61 
Nothing about this limited argument requires local courts to take opinion 
polls in difficult statutory cases. But it provides local judges some measure 
of freedom to interpret statutes in a way that departs from faithfully serving 
the enacting legislature, and it gives them the ability to promote the 
interests of their constituents more directly. This result is recommended not 
only because judges are capable of being held accountable by an electorate, 
but also because of local political dynamics that make the local legislature 
itself a weak source of democratic authority.62 Local city council members 
and county commissioners are rarely subject to vigorous democratic compe-
tition, so even if the democratic quality of elections for judicial officers is 
low,63 those who are writing the statutory code for local ordinances are not 
necessarily subject to any greater democratic controls. If local legislative 
elections are also quite deficient as democratic control mechanisms, forcing 
elected judges to serve as their agents is not necessarily sound. 
Statutory interpretation decisions should ultimately invite considera-
tions of comparative democratic credentials, not embody a separation-of-
powers formalism built for a different federal system with very different 
political cultures and sets of institutions and selection mechanisms.64 
Assuming there is essentially a tie between two sets of imperfect elections 
for two different branches of government, the norm of providing reasons for 
 
59 See BONNEAU, supra note 3, at 11. 
60 See Matthew J. Streb et al., Contestation, Competition, and the Potential for Accountability in 
Intermediate Appellate Court Elections, 91 JUDICATURE 70, 73 tbl.1 (2007) (finding that about 65% of 
incumbent state supreme court justices and 27% of incumbent intermediate appellate court judges 
were challenged between 2000 and 2006). 
61 See supra note 55. 
62 See, e.g., David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections?: 
The Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419, 426 (2007) (“[L]ocal government does not meet the 
most basic definitions of democracy—it does not provide voters with the ability to replace incum-
bents with opponents with different views and to have their views represented in local policies.”).  
63 The democratic quality of local elections may decrease for several reasons, including no 
meaningful party heuristics available to voters in the class of nonpartisan races, little information 
available to voters because of low amounts of campaign spending associated with these races, and 
few alternatives offered. 
64 See Bruhl & Leib, supra note †, at 1239-41 (arguing for a “comparative institutional analysis” 
that accounts for the resources and competencies of different branches of government). 
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decisions, prevalent in the courts65 but not required of local legislatures,66 
could provide a tiebreaker to enable judges to use ambiguities and omissions 
within code schemes to pursue localist interests. In any case, the separation 
of powers—and related worries about the judiciary subsuming legislative 
functions—is quite likely not as central in understanding local governance 
as it is in understanding state and national governance.67 
Although some studies have suggested that citizens are concerned more 
about procedural fairness than a judge’s attention to public opinion,68 there 
is substantial empirical evidence that voters have a more complex under-
standing of the role of judicial elections.69 Survey evidence reveals that 
voters prefer a “delegate role” or “steward role” of judges subject to election 
rather than a “trustee role.”70 Those who agree with the “delegate role” believe 
that “[e]lections should tell the judges what the people want, and the judges 
should follow the people’s desires.”71 Those who agree with the “steward role” 
believe that “[e]lections should only inform the judges of the general feelings 
of the people so that judges don’t become too isolated.”72 Finally, those who 
agree with the “trustee role” believe that “[e]lections should support those 
judges who are independent of public opinion and remain unaffected by the 
people’s demands.”73 The majority of survey respondents agrees with the 
first two roles and highly disagrees with the trusteeship model.74 Even 
judges themselves, when asked, view themselves as “stewards” rather than as 
 
65 See generally Ethan J. Leib, David Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 
101 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 44-46) (on file with author) (describing the 
fiduciary duties of judges, including the dialogic imperative, as “an affirmative duty to engage in 
dialogue with those whose interests the public fiduciary representative[, the judge,] holds in trust”). 
66 See United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that 
legislators have the “prerogative of obscurantism”). 
67 See, e.g., Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565, 579 (R.I. 2011) (“After considering the argu-
ments raised by the parties, we hold that the separation of powers doctrine is a concept foreign to 
municipal governance.”). Thanks to Annie Decker and her paper for the pointers here. See Annie 
Decker, Local Common Law (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
68 See generally Singer, supra note 48, at 1456-57 (stating that the public supports appellate 
courts that make decisions using “competent, reasonable, and fair” procedures). 
69 See Lovrich & Sheldon, supra note 56, at 36 tbl.4; see also Charles H. Sheldon & Nicholas 
P. Lovrich, Jr., Judicial Accountability vs. Responsibility: Balancing the Views of Voters and Judges, 65 
JUDICATURE 470, 476 tbl.3, 477 (1982) (finding that citizens who register to vote, though not 
necessarily those who actually vote in judicial elections, tend to prefer the “steward” or “delegate” 
view of judicial elections). 
70 Lovrich & Sheldon, supra note 56, at 36 tbl.4. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
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fully independent “trustees.”75 This suggests that both citizens and judges 
expect elections to have a meaningful input into elected judges’ decisions.76 
Of course, one might want a different kind of legal system that does not 
give the people and the judges what they want. But, as suggested above, 
there are other normative reasons to allow local interests to affect hard 
statutory interpretation cases.77 
The conclusion here—that local judges have some berth of discretion to 
pursue localist judging within statutory interpretation decisions about local 
ordinances—may be useful for scholars looking to promote autonomy at the 
local level. Although most “pro-localism” theorists have focused their 
attention on ways local legislatures and agencies can promote local goods 
within state and federal structures, local judges may advance this goal as 
well. Yet skeptics of local autonomy probably should not be too rankled by 
this underappreciated channel for localism because it is a modest power and 
 
75 See Sheldon & Lovrich, supra note 69, at 476 tbl.3 (finding that 56% of judges in Washington 
“agree” or “strongly agree” that judicial “[e]lections should only inform the judges of the general 
feelings of the people so that judges won’t become too isolated”) In addition, there is substantial 
evidence that elected judges are responsive to constituents. E.g., Paul Brace & Brent D. Boyea, 
State Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Practice of Electing Judges, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 360, 370 
(2008) (concluding that elected judges are affected by their constituents’ opinion on capital 
punishment); Gordon & Huber, supra note 3, at 109 (“Even those incumbents who do not share 
their constituents’ preferences . . . may nonetheless behave faithfully . . . if their failure to do so 
will result in their subsequent punishment at the polls.”); Huber & Gordon, supra note 3, at 249 
(“[A]s election approaches, officials will moderate their behavior to more closely approximate the 
wishes of some pivotal constituent.”). 
76 The most recently available evidence suggests that elections confer a net benefit for per-
ceptions of legitimacy. See James L. Gibson et al., The Effects of Judicial Campaign Activity on the 
Legitimacy of Courts: A Survey-Based Experiment, 64 POL. RES. Q. 545, 553-54 (2011) (finding that 
judicial elections in Pennsylvania enhance legitimacy).  
77  There are obviously many people who argue that elective judiciaries are normatively at-
tractive precisely because they better reflect preferences of the polity. See, e.g., CHRIS W. BONNEAU 
& MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 7 (2009) (“Overall, we would 
expect judges chosen by democratic processes to reflect the political preferences of their states at 
the time they are chosen . . . .”); Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of 
State Judges: The Role of Popular Judicial Elections, 40 SW. L.J. 31, 34 (1986) (arguing that “judges 
should be sensitive and responsive to the political, economic, social, moral, and ethical views held 
by a majority of citizens.”); Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian 
Difficulty, 96 VA. L. REV. 719, 757 (2010) (positing that elected judges may take pains to satisfy the 
voters’ preferences and to preemptively allay potential popular criticisms). Some even think 
elective judiciaries might perform better than appointive judiciaries on professional measures. See 
Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical 
Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 290, 326-27 (2010) 
(questioning the superiority of appointed judges by measuring how elected judges are more 
productive in resolving cases and, at least when elected through partisan elections, display a high 
degree of judicial independence). But I am not concerned here with the general desirability of 
judicial elections: they exist and the question is whether the fact of judicial elections should affect 
how judging ought to be done. 
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does not create any of the dangers of local autonomy they have traditionally 
feared. Local judges can be corrected by their judicial superiors at higher 
levels of the state judiciary—and state legislatures can always pre-empt local 
ordinances—if and when local judges’ interpretations exceed what the state 
is willing to tolerate.78 Accordingly, the risks associated with localist inter-
pretive freedom surrounding local law are miniscule.  
Further, minorities in homogeneous communities will generally face no 
greater risk under localist judging than they do when local judges serve as 
“faithful agents” of the local legislature. Interlocal problems must generally 
be resolved at a higher level of government anyway. And interlocal matters and 
multijurisdictional citizens might actually do better under the prevalent regime 
where the local judge is responsible for several adjacent localities and can better 
consider all her constituents’ needs and interests. Allowing local judges to have 
regional jurisdictions that expand beyond the narrow reach of a town or city 
council, for example, enables a spirit of localism to prevail, all while vindicating 
the needs of a slightly broader constituency. In short, this way of thinking about 
the permissible scope of statutory interpretation seems to accommodate both 
the “pro-local” community and those skeptical of too much local autonomy.  
C. Is There a Case for Localist Readings of State Law? 
The case for localist readings of law does not translate perfectly when 
local judges are interpreting statutes that originate with the state legislature 
rather than a local legislature. When local courts are applying state statutory 
law—such as when they are hearing misdemeanor cases under state penal 
codes, contract cases under a state’s version of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, cases under statewide consumer protection law, or other local applica-
tions of state statutes—may a local court infuse its statutory interpretation 
decisions with an effort to vindicate the interests of its locality, or must it 
serve as a “faithful agent” of the state legislature? Is there a case, in other 
words, for a kind of “intrastate judicial federalism” in the statutory interpre-
tation of statewide laws? This Section reviews some of the justifications for 
and mechanics of judicial federalism on the national level and explores 
whether judicial federalism really can go all the way down to the intrastate 
level. It ultimately offers affirmative reasons for why we should be comfort-
able with localist judging against the background of state statutes. 
The Supreme Court has explained that “[f]ederalism, central to the 
[federal] constitutional design, adopts the principle that both the National 
and State Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to 
 
78 See Diller, supra note 8, at 1140-41 (comparing preemption at the state and federal levels). 
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respect.”79 And just as federalism has been used within the federal judicial 
system to justify state courts’ speaking on matters of federal law,80 might a 
similar principle be defensible within states? For example, if a state decides 
to outlaw low-waisted pants (“sagging”),81 can localities fill in statutory gaps 
(about what qualifies as “sagging,” for example) with the local courts’ sense 
of local norms and the interests of the local population? Or should the local 
court endeavor only to pursue purely and with fidelity the state legislature’s 
policy and intent?82 Or, for example, may ambiguities in the meaning of 
“good faith” for the purposes of statutory contract law vary by locality until 
the highest state court issues an authoritative ruling?  
1. Judicial Federalism 
Although there remains debate about the optimal levels of autonomy to 
provide to localities, it is rare to think of local governments as truly sover-
eign.83 But this difference does not necessarily destroy the utility of thinking 
about localities as analogous to states in the typical “reverse-Erie” scenario, 
in which states apply substantive federal law. Even in the environment of 
dual sovereignty on the national stage, federal law is uncontroversially 
supreme over state judges84 just as state law is conventionally deemed 
supreme over local law.85 In the federal context, the clear hierarchy might 
seem to compel a result that forces state courts to be extremely deferential 
to the federal legislature in the interpretation of federal statutory law86—just 
 
79 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012). 
80 See generally Clermont, supra note 17, at 30-31. 
81 Lawmakers in Louisiana, for example, proposed such a law. See H.R. 1626, 2004 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (La. 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.la.us/leg_docs/04RS/CVT6/OUT/0000 
LE3D.PDF. 
82 Of course, for these purposes, we will have to leave to one side the difficulties with the 
concept of legislative intent. See Bellia, supra note 17, at 1528 (summarizing the problems with 
looking to legislative intent: “(1) that legislatures cannot have a real intent, (2) that individual 
legislators often lack real intent regarding specific statutory applications, and (3) that statutory 
purposes . . . can be multifarious and malleable”).  
83 See, e.g., Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 269, 269 (1968) (claiming that localities “are regarded legally as occupying a 
subordinate status within the state; and, as a rule, they derive their existence and all their powers 
from the state constitution and state legislative enactments”). 
84 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State 
to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
85 See Vanlandingham, supra note 83, at 269. 
86 See Bellia, supra note 17, at 1529-52 (finding historically that state judges felt less free to 
engage in equitable interpretation when interpreting federal statutes than when interpreting state 
statutes). 
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as we might conclude that localities are subordinate to states when inter-
preting state law. When states interpret and apply federal law, state court 
decisional freedom may lead to disuniformity and forum-shopping, which 
are presumptively disfavored.87 By analogy, we might similarly worry about 
intrastate disuniformity and forum-shopping if localities were permitted to 
infuse state law with the preferences of local constituencies rather than 
more aggressively pursuing statewide policies. 
However, perhaps surprisingly, in so-called “reverse-Erie” cases in which 
state courts—the “local” courts for these purposes—apply federal law, most 
courts do not feel constrained to adopt constructions of federal law an-
nounced by any federal court below the Supreme Court.88 And the sky has 
not fallen, notwithstanding the disuniformity that has invariably resulted.89 
No one, for example, thinks federal law is quite the same in Texas as it is in 
the Massachusetts.90 Indeed, this patchwork of applications of federal law 
might actually be celebrated as “dialectical federalism”91 or “polyphonic 
 
87 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938); Bellia, supra note 17, at 1557  
(discussing “constitutional limitations” that require state courts to serve as “faithful agents of 
Congress”); Clermont, supra note 17, at 36 (suggesting that federal courts “lean toward applying 
state law when necessary” to avoid forum shopping or disuniformity). Bellia argues that states did 
not (in the years 1787 to 1840) and should not see themselves as anything but faithful agents of the 
federal legislature. See Bellia, supra note 17, at 1547-52. 
88 See Hall v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 851 A.2d 859, 863-64 (Pa. 2004) (collecting cases and 
finding that a “vast majority of state supreme courts” do not hold lower federal court pronounce-
ments on federal law to be binding); Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on 
the Standards State Judges Should Use To Ascertain Federal Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1173-
76 (1999) (noting the structural and practical reasons that state courts cite in declining to be bound 
by lower federal court decisions). 
89 See generally Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1584-1606, 1612 
(2008) (challenging the traditional notion that uniformity is a proper or practical goal of the 
federal judiciary and arguing for regional deference). 
90 But see John Jay, Address Before the Continental Congress (Apr. 13, 1787) (arguing that it 
would be “irrational” for “the same Article of the same treaty” to be “made to mean one thing in 
New Hampshire, another thing in New York, and neither the one nor the other of them in 
Georgia”), reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 589, 590 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph 
Lerner eds., 1987). Putting to one side whether this is irrational or suboptimal for treaties, it is not 
at all clear that all average statutes—with their ambiguities, gaps, and omissions—need to carry 
precisely the same meaning in New Hampshire, New York, and Georgia. Indeed, I doubt very 
much anyone thinks they do prior to final adjudication at the Supreme Court. One Southern 
District of New York judge’s pronouncement on federal law is not even binding on other judges in 
the Southern District, to say nothing of judges in the Eastern District of New York or the 
Northern District of California. And the Republic still stands. In fact, the Republic may actually 
be improved by this disuniformity, for reasons I explain presently.  
91 Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the 
Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1046 (1977). 
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federalism.”92 Even if some were to criticize the resultant disuniformity on 
formalistic federal supremacy grounds or a more practical aversion to chaos, 
there are reasons not to be too persnickety about state courts applying 
federal law in a local way, at least interstitially as ambiguous or vague 
federal statutes are litigated on their way to the Supreme Court.  
After all, there are several plausible ways of making sense of the principle 
of supremacy. Even if one concedes that the Supreme Court has the final 
word on the interpretation of federal statutes and federal law,93 it is not 
obvious that federal supremacy requires that lower federal court construc-
tions control state courts.94 Accordingly, it is consistent with a credible vision 
of supremacy that state courts may diverge from lower federal court inter-
pretations of federal law without running afoul of the principle.95 Federal 
supremacy surely entails that no federal jurisdiction is bound by a state 
interpretation of a federal law, but it does not obviously disable the state 
interpretation from controlling within the state courts until the Supreme 
Court declares what federal law means. Yet just because this type of supremacy 
would permit a level of disuniformity does not make it desirable. Proving 
the desirability of this model requires a more sustained argument.  
The key to the desirability of this mode of judicial federalism—moderate 
amounts of “chaos” notwithstanding—is that state-level judges can provide 
valuable information to federal officials about how state residents would 
prefer federal law to be implemented when federal law otherwise does not 
provide clear text or reconstructions of legislative intent. Because there is a 
symbiotic and relational dimension to state implementation of federal law,96 
 
92 Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 285 
(2005). See generally Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal 
Courts, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1409 (1999). 
93 This is not a universally conceded point. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Cooper v. Aaron and 
the Faces of Federalism, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1087, 1096-97 (2008) (arguing that state governments 
do not have an obligation to implement Supreme Court decisions on federal law). 
94 See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1998) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“An Arkansas 
trial court is bound by this Court’s (and by the Arkansas Supreme Court’s and Arkansas Court of 
Appeals’) interpretation of federal law, but if it follows the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of 
federal law, it does so only because it chooses to and not because it must.”); CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 45, at 294 n.25 (6th ed. 2002). 
95 But see Bellia, supra note 17, at 1552-57 (suggesting a different vision of supremacy that 
renders state court control over federal law and its application very limited). 
96 Cf. DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 125 (1995) (“In sum, the states in our 
federal system serve not only as a countervailing force to federal power, but as an additional 
moderator of their own internal conflicts.”); Charlton C. Copeland, Federal Law in State Court: 
Judicial Federalism Through a Relational Lens, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 511, 531 (2011) (arguing 
in favor of enforcing federalism through a conception of relational federalism). Obviously, some 
have a quite different view that emphasizes a more dominant role of federal law over state courts. 
See Redish & Sklaver, supra note 18, at 73 (concluding that “the enormous federal deference to 
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there is an affirmative reason to allow and encourage state courts to pursue 
“local” preferences when federal law is unclear. After all, the citizens of 
states—who often directly elect their state judges but have virtually nothing 
to do with the federal judiciary—are also citizens of the nation. Meeting 
citizens’ interests and preferences contributes to federal legitimacy, even if 
it does not promote interstate uniformity.  
True enough, federal lawmaking is ostensibly controlled by the bicamer-
alism and presentment provisions of Article I, Section 7 in the U.S. Consti-
tution, which does not think of state courts as partners in federal lawmaking.97 
But state courts are generally thought to have “inherent authority” and are 
“presumptively competent[] to adjudicate claims arising under” federal 
law98 with the understanding that this fact can lead to disuniformity. If 
uniformity had been the Constitution’s primary value, exclusive rather than 
concurrent jurisdiction for federal claims would have been a more natural 
choice, and lower federal courts would have been required to follow one 
another. Instead, in the current system—which gives state courts a berth of 
interpretive freedom—the federal government can learn about state prefer-
ences, and that input improves legitimacy and informs federal judges and 
other federal officials about how the law works or does not work on the 
ground. If states fall too far out of line, federal review is generally possible, 
at least in theory,99 and federal lawmakers and bureaucrats can close the 
legal gaps that create opportunities for disuniformity in the first place by 
passing new laws and implementing new regulations. This vision respects 
hierarchy, supremacy, and a modicum of uniformity on the one hand, all 
while generating the benefits of better information, policy experimentation, 
and regime legitimacy on the other. 
There are still other practical reasons not to prohibit state courts from 
speaking with some interpretive freedom when deciding hard cases under 
federal law. To wit, because many state judges are elected or find themselves 
within a very different political climate than their federal counterparts, it 
 
state judiciaries that the Supreme Court currently requires from the lower federal courts actually 
stands the governing theory of judicial federalism on its head”). 
97 See Bellia, supra note 17, at 1548-52 (“[F]or state courts to self-consciously interpret federal 
statutes to make new federal law in forward-looking ways would jettison the specific procedures by 
which the Constitution provides that new federal law may be made.” (citing Bradford R. Clark, 
Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001))). 
98 Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990). 
99 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006) (authorizing Supreme Court review of state court judgments 
on federal law). Practically speaking, the Supreme Court can only review a small fraction of state 
interpretations of federal law. 
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might be quite difficult for them to remove their “judico-cultural vestment”100 
just for a class of federal cases; indeed, state courts are often hearing federal 
claims appended to state claims. Therefore, if state elections free state 
judges to function less as “faithful agents” in state law, perhaps we should 
not worry if that interpretive disposition bleeds into the interpretation of 
federal law; that is again a product of constitutional design. For structural 
reasons, state judges are not easily characterized as “faithful agents”101 of the 
federal legislature.102 The faithful-agent principle was largely developed as a 
model of statutory interpretation within the federal system—at least in part 
owing to judges’ appointive status and life tenure. The principle is more 
attenuated as applied to state judges, who have other important fidelities, 
such as constituents, if a judge is elected, and the state constitution more 
generally.103  
Ultimately, normative and practical reasons align to permit and encour-
age state judges to have some interpretive freedom in their understanding 
of federal law, arguably to promote concerns at the state level.104 Asking 
state courts to predict how the Supreme Court would rule rather than how 
their own jurisdiction wants federal law to be implemented may be asking 
them to do something well outside their competence.105 They often have 
more credible democratic authority to interpret law in a manner favorable to 
their own localities. This authority does not imply that state judges may 
 
100 Thanks to Jim Brudney for the turn of phrase. The core of the idea is that judges routinely 
subject to popular election may be responsive to their constituents as a cultural matter; it would be 
hard to have those very same judges switch cultural affinities when interpreting federal law. 
101 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial 
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 991-92, 1099-1105 (2001) 
(exploring the “faithful agent” view of the judge in statutory interpretation cases). 
102 Bellia presents evidence that he believes shows that founding-era state judges saw them-
selves as faithful agents. See generally Bellia, supra note 17, at 1529-52 (“[S]tate courts [in the thirty 
years following ratification] generally understood their proper role in interpreting federal statutes to 
be that of discerning and enforcing the directives of Congress.”). But with the rise of state judicial 
selection mechanisms that were unknown in the period Bellia studied, it is very hard to draw any 
clean conclusions about what state judges can plausibly be expected to do today.  
103 See generally Bruhl & Leib, supra note †, at 1272 (“[T]he [state judges’] decisional freedom’s 
best justification derives from features of state constitutional structure and pragmatic knowledge 
about state politics, state legislatures, and constituent preference.”). 
104 But see Bellia, supra note 17, at 1548-50 (suggesting that the Supremacy Clause encourages 
state courts to enforce legislative objectives when interpreting federal statutes, rather than their 
own “equitable interpretations”); Clermont, supra note 17, at 30-32 (arguing that, while state courts 
should make decisions “in accordance with existing federal law by trying to discern what the 
federal courts would decide is the law,” state courts should not consider themselves “actually 
bound, rather than merely informed, by the local federal courts’ rulings”). 
105 But see Clermont, supra note 17, at 31-32 (“The better view . . . is that the state court 
should try to determine what the U.S. Supreme Court would rule. . . . This is no place to let a 
thousand flowers bloom.”). 
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completely ignore the risks of interjurisdictional disuniformity, but uni-
formity is just one relevant value to weigh against others. 
2. Judicial Federalism All the Way Down? 
These arguments may not apply in the intrastate context, however, for a 
few reasons. First, because municipalities are not conventionally viewed as 
legally sovereign,106 providing their judges with the perquisites of sovereign-
ty is necessarily less justified. Similarly, notwithstanding their oath to 
uphold the federal Constitution, state judges are generally allegiant to the 
state rather than the federal government in the “reverse-Erie” context. This 
state allegiance makes it very difficult to view state courts as “faithful agents” 
of the federal legislature or the federal court system. By contrast, when local 
judges apply state law, they are much more likely to acknowledge the reach of 
the state into the locality.107 Finally, although it was possible in the purely 
local context when comparing the democratic credibility of local judicial 
elections with local legislative elections to reject a “faithful agent” model, 
the state legislature likely has more substantial democratic merits relative to 
local judicial elections, making it much more attractive to see local judges as 
“faithful agents” of the state legislature. None of these arguments distinguish-
ing intrastate judicial federalism, however, is dispositive. 
In considering whether locally elected judges should decide difficult 
state statutory cases with some interpretive freedom to pursue localist 
agendas, there cannot be a singular answer for all local judges. Each state’s 
legal culture is potentially sui generis, and each state’s relationship with its 
local governments is regulated by a patchwork of constitutional and statutory 
provisions that could help determine the degree to which local interpretation 
of statewide law may be tolerated.108 Furthermore, different subject areas 
likely carry different mandates for state uniformity: for example, it might be 
more important to have consistent rulings on employees’ rights than on how 
much “sag” constitutes indecent exposure. And good faith standards in 
 
106 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
107 Most county court judges in Nebraska are unequivocal that they are part of the state judi-
ciary—even though they hear cases under local law. They do not see themselves as local, most 
likely because of their original appointment by the governor rather than local election (though 
they stand for retention elections), the local legal culture, and the lack of local home rule. See supra 
note 21. Judges in Ohio, by contrast, tend to think of themselves as part of the local government 
(with some exceptions). Nevertheless, they recognize the reach of the state into their jurisdictions, 
especially when they are adjudicating cases under state law. See supra note 34. 
108 Perhaps when home-rule provisions extended to localities are more generous, the local 
judge may fairly think of herself as having been granted some local legal autonomy over state law. 
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contract law might affect primary behavior in a way that militates in favor of 
requiring intrastate uniformity.  
Moreover, how a local court is created should influence a judge’s inter-
pretation of state law. When state law creates the local courts directly, a 
faithful agency relationship is more likely to exist between the state legisla-
ture and the local court, such that it is easier to dismiss a local judge’s ability 
to pursue a localist agenda. When state law delegates to localities the ability 
to establish their own courts, however, there is a clear disruption of the 
principal–agent relationship between state legislature and local court. This 
distance should perhaps enable a local judge to see her local population as 
her primary principal.  
Addressing the first significant difference between the federal system 
and the intrastate system, it is important to remember that sovereignty is 
not an essential part of the argument for allowing states leeway in their 
interpretation of federal law in reverse-Erie contexts absent an authoritative 
reading from the Supreme Court.109 Sovereignty does much more work in 
the plain vanilla Erie context in which federal courts are bound—supremacy 
notwithstanding—to apply state substantive law to disputes arising under 
diversity jurisdiction.110 Thus, the fact that local courts do not necessarily 
represent a dueling sovereignty does not decide the question. If the same 
benefits that accrue interstate apply in the picture of intrastate judicial 
federalism sketched above, the same regime could be adopted within a state: 
local courts may apply statewide law with local flavor, balancing the need for 
uniformity, but not feeling bound until an authoritative case emerges from 
the state’s highest court. 
The second difference in the intrastate context is the fact that local judges 
may feel just as bound to the state as to the locality. This dual allegiance, 
however, does not vitiate the possibility for localist interpretations of state 
laws. Indeed, the state can choose not to have any intrastate diversity in 
readings of statewide statutes by more directly controlling local judiciaries 
and integrating them more fully into the state system. For example, in 
Nebraska’s county courts, district-based judging can still be neatly woven into 
a state judicial system with very little invitation for localist judging; Nebraska 
 
109 But see Clermont, supra note 17, at 43 (“[T]he same notion of cooperative federalism  
applies in both [Erie and reverse-Erie] situations, calling for comity when one sovereign is enforcing 
the other’s law. The problem is the same.”). 
110 See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) (“The laws of the several states, except where the Constitu-
tion or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be 
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they 
apply.”); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
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uses gubernatorial appointment prior to retention elections.111 Ultimately, 
however, the very choice to make judges locally accountable through 
elections underwrites a certain interpretive freedom. And even if local 
judges freely interpret state law, there is no danger that important disuni-
formities will remain unchecked through the litigation process, because local 
court decisions are appealable into the state system.112 This interpretive 
freedom is not tantamount to an invitation to ignore clear state law; the 
discretion to promote local interests through localist judging works inter-
stitially (just as in the reverse-Erie context above), which is exactly what makes 
it so useful as a feedback mechanism to state courts and state legislatures. 
Indeed, it works better intrastate because appeals to higher courts within 
the states can be taken as of right, which is a better supremacy mechanism 
than discretionary Supreme Court review of highest state courts. 
But why isn’t the local judge required to be a faithful agent of the state 
legislature? A municipality’s relationship with the state government is not 
similar to the state’s relationship to the federal government, because the 
state may disband and control the municipality at will.113 It might seem like 
a natural outgrowth of this dominance that local judges are instrumentalities 
of the state, at least when interpreting state law.  
Yet this conclusion is not necessary, precisely because of the ambiguity 
in what dominance means. Just as there are different ways of thinking about 
the hierarchical nature of judicial federalism, which flows from a constitu-
tional commitment to federal supremacy, dominance does not have one 
unambiguous meaning. Ultimately, even if it is true that local judges should 
be faithful agents of the state legislature as a general matter, dominance as 
such might be triggered only when local needs directly conflict with state 
law. But nothing about dominance (and the looming threat of dissolution by 
the state) undermines the design choice of local elections for local judges, 
which all but ensures that these judges are serving two different masters: 
the state constituency and the local constituency. (This, indeed, may be the 
state’s intention.) The local constituency influences the local judge’s interstitial 
 
111 Nebraska’s judges were nearly uniform in their self-conscious allegiance to state over local-
ity, even though they are subject to local retention elections. See sources cited supra note 21.  
112 See infra Appendix. 
113 This is, after all, the most canonical of interpretations of the most recognized local govern-
ment case, Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, which stated,  
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient 
agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be en-
trusted to them . . . . [T]he powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory 
over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State.  
207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907). 
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decisionmaking, because the judge risks losing her job otherwise. These 
institutional dynamics cannot be wished away, and they undermine the 
claim of faithful agency to a singular principal—the State.  
In contexts where the state’s policy preferences are clear within the stat-
utory scheme, there is little doubt that the local court has an obligation to 
follow the state’s authoritative interpretation. This obligation gives due 
respect to dominance, too. Interpretive freedom should not apply to this set 
of cases. But when state judicial and statutory pronouncements are ambiguous 
or vague, localist judging may be permissible. Contentious issues may be 
susceptible to diverse interpretations. The most foundational work in local 
government law rightly highlights that different localities have different 
environments, which are attractive to different kinds of residents that might 
prefer different kinds of local conditions.114 Those conditions can be pursued 
by local legislatures and local judges, not just by states. Dominance requires 
that state high courts and the state legislature have the final say within the 
state. But in the interstices—conceptually and temporally—local courts may be 
localist in orientation, garnering some of the benefits of interjurisdictional 
competition for the hearts and minds of citizens, without needing to hinder 
statewide solutions to genuinely larger and interlocal policy problems.  
This position is ultimately both “pro-local” and conscious of the pathol-
ogies of excessive localism. It allows narrow local policy experimentation,115 
while retaining direct state supervision on a case-by-case basis. This case-
by-case oversight is not possible through the blunt mechanisms of one-size-
fits-all home rule and preemption decisions at the state legislative or 
constitutional level. Those wholesale decisions are less easily calibrated to 
optimal governance than a specific judicial application of a statewide statute 
at the retail level. State judges hearing appeals—a class of judges seen 
somewhat more easily as serving the state directly (even when elected by a 
larger constituency)—can vindicate state interests when necessary. Struc-
tural state dominance over localities also means that state legislatures and 
executives are able to close gaps in their earlier statutes. But these other 
 
114 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 
(1956) (“[A]t the local level . . . the consumer-voter moves to that community whose local 
government best satisfies his set of preferences.”); see also Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s 
Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329, 332, 382 (2003) (“[H]orizontal 
competition among states and localities helps to ensure that citizens will have an array of 
governmental options from which to choose and that governments will have a marketlike incentive 
to satisfy citizens’ demands in increasingly different ways.”). 
115 See Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1135 
(2012) (exploring the role of local policy experimentation in the debates about municipal 
legislative freedom). The Diller discussion could be expanded to support a measure of “intrastate 
judicial federalism,” embedded in a hierarchical and supervised system of localist activism. 
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state institutions can reserve their curtailment of localist judging for matters 
of more substantial import to the health of the state and statewide goals.  
Yet it remains important to note that state judges and state legislatures 
need not always pursue uniformity when they design statewide schemes. 
State legislatures and state-level judiciaries may ultimately prefer the “new 
governance” model—rather than preemption116—which reinforces localist 
activism through enactment of broader state laws that “increase flexibility, 
improve participation, foster experimentation and deliberation, and accom-
modate regulation by multiple levels of government.”117 Even with only 
modest and statutory—rather than constitutional—home-rule provisions, 
localities have retained autonomy in the face of state authority, moderate 
conflicts with state law notwithstanding, because states have appreciated the 
role of local self-determination in governance.118 Even when the state appa-
ratus decides to pull rank and flash its dominance, the vision of intrastate 
judicial federalism suggested here gives those state-level actors the benefit 
of more local knowledge about how to plan ahead.119 If, with respect to a 
particular policy, a state prefers uniformity and preemption, it will at least 
benefit from the learning made possible through interstitial localist judging.  
 
116 For evidence that states do not always opt for preemption, their dominance notwithstanding, 
see Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & POL. 1, 17-27 (2006). 
117 David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Legal Regulation: Complemen-
tarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539, 539 (2006).  
118 Local self-determination plays a positive role so long as there are no harmful external 
effects. See Briffault, supra note 116, at 19 (“[I]f it is a question of local political structure and there 
are no external effects and no state harm from intrastate variations, local innovations can prevail 
notwithstanding the conflict with state law.”). 
119 These ideas are indebted in part to the kind of governance studied and promoted in the 
work of Chuck Sabel. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 428 (1998) (identifying a new form of decentralized 
government in which local knowledge is harnessed to inform individual, regional, and national 
decisions through information pooling allocated according to policy problems rather than formal 
hierarchy); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimental-
ist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 841-52 (2000) (arguing that drug courts, as “experimentalist 
institutions,” efficiently pool information, which better informs remedial plans at both individual 
and aggregate levels); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes: Institutional-
ization as a Response to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 
1297-1300 (2012) (reviewing the structure of new contextualizing regimes that blur public and 
private distinctions while still utilizing normative output from stakeholders); Charles F. Sabel & 
William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 
82 (2011) (“Experimentalism emphasizes stake-holder participation to elicit and reconcile the 
diverse views and interests of people distinctively affected by and knowledgeable about the matters 
in issue.”). Although Sabel saw how drug courts could fit into the picture, he has not generalized 
to see all local courts as “experimentalist” actors within state systems.  
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D. Questions for Further Study 
The argument for localist judging in a narrow band of hard cases seems 
to work for both local ordinances and state statutes. If it works, it works as a 
result of at least three characteristics of local courts, which I have treated as 
essential to their design, but which are, in fact, not true of every court 
judges or citizens perceive as a local court. Local courts, for the purposes of 
the inquiry here, are presumptively staffed by professional lawyers, are 
directly supervised by the state judiciary through a system of appeals, and 
have elected judges. Without these features, the argument for localist 
judging is less clearly persuasive.  
If local courts are staffed with laypeople, the basic conditions for the rule 
of law may not be met.120 And with such inadequate rule of law in the 
courtroom, giving more discretion to laypeople within our legal system is 
treacherous. Moreover, much of the argument for localist judging in this 
Article is predicated on state oversight; therefore, if a local court is not 
reviewable within the state system, this paper does not provide the same 
support for interpretive freedom.121 In such cases, the communication 
dynamics could more easily break down between state and locality. And it is 
that communicative relationship that makes localist judging productive in 
experimentalist policymaking. Without direct supervision, the dominance 
of the state also recedes, inviting too many of the pathologies of excessive 
localism already identified by critics of localism.  
Finally, much of the argument for localist judging here is predicated on 
the elective status of the judges in the local courts. This argument primarily 
relies on observations made elsewhere.122 Direct judicial election accounts 
for much of what disrupts the faithful agent account of judging in statutory 
interpretation cases. Back-end accountability and specific state design 
choices to make local judges accountable to their communities invites 
interpretive discretion in a manner that a state-centered appointment system 
for selecting local judges without accountability may not. Whether appoint-
ed local judges deserve similar interpretive freedom has not been explored 
here, though the fact that many appointed judges desire reappointment 
 
120 In this vein, see the several New York Times articles on New York’s village and town 
courts, supra note 2. 
121 On the other hand, a lack of state oversight or review mechanisms may actually provide 
additional justification for localist judging. As Professor Bruhl suggested to me in his comments 
reviewing this manuscript, it may be that a constitutional design allowing for less review could be 
seen as a state choice to allow for local variation. Still, the dangers of this design may outweigh the 
benefits of local experimentation. 
122 See Bruhl & Leib, supra note †, at Part III.B.  
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from local political actors, whose preferences they may try to estimate in 
their decisionmaking, may support a form of interpretative freedom, too.123 
The argument supporting localist judging also raises a few other ques-
tions that cannot be explored in this context. For example, there are cases of 
statutory interpretation in which state judges have a plain-vanilla corollary 
to the Erie problem: they may need to apply local law even though they are 
quite clearly state judges. What ought they do in such circumstances? Does 
their appointive or elective status have any bearing on whether they should 
pursue statewide preferences, the preferences of their own constituents, or 
the preferences of the local community that passed the law itself? A more 
comprehensive articulation of a vision for “intrastate judicial federalism” 
would need to address those issues. 
There are also difficult questions about whether the argument for localist 
judging works at higher level courts constituted through district-based 
electoral systems. Examples include Louisiana and Oklahoma, whose highest 
court judges are subject to elections within districts rather than statewide.124 
Do those judges have any obligation or permission to pursue the interests of 
their districts rather than their states? This Article does not provide an 
answer to this question, but it at least provides some analytics to evaluate 
likely possibilities.  
It might also be possible to use the analytics surrounding professionalism, 
supervision, and elective status to assess whether any similar interpretive 
freedom is permissible or desirable in cases involving the common law 
and/or constitutional law. I have focused on statutory interpretation here, in 
part because the bulk of these courts’ workloads involves statutory applica-
tion. It is also much clearer to see how the “faithful agent” model associated 
with statutory interpretation in the federal courts is disrupted in the state 
and local environment. Theories of judging within the common-law and 
constitutional-adjudication traditions may reveal fewer places to root such 
arguments for interpretive discretion.125 
CONCLUSION 
We know too little about how citizens experience law in their local 
courts and how judges think of their roles when they are elected by local 
constituencies. Much more research is necessary to understand these courts’ 
 
123 Thanks to Professor Richard Briffault for the suggestion. 
124 See LA. CONST. art. V, § 4; OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3. 
125 My first effort to think through the roles of the judge in these three classes of cases can be 
found in Leib, Ponet & Serota, supra note 65.  
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roles in sustaining the legitimacy of our legal system and how judges in 
these courts perceive their complex roles within their communities. This 
Article posits that local courts are often closely tied up with the structures of 
local government and may—accordingly but perhaps counter-intuitively—
have some interpretive freedom in how they read ordinances that emerge 
from local governments and laws that emerge from state legislatures. In 
short, local courts may sometimes pursue localist statutory interpretation in 
a class of hard cases, and it can be normatively attractive that they do. 
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APPENDIX: STATE JUDICIAL ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS126 
 
 
 
 
 
126 A useful application for reviewing state court structures is available at the Court Statistics 
Project. See State Court Structure Charts, CT. STAT. PROJECT, http://www.courtstatistics.org/ 
Other-Pages/State_Court_Structure_Charts.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). I have adapted a few 
graphical hierarchies here to enable readers to see where “local courts” appear within the tapestry 
of state judicial systems. 
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